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Abstract 
 
Despite the fact that the role of learning is recognised in empirical and theoretical work on 
sense of agency (SoA), the nature of this learning has, rather surprisingly, received little 
attention. In the present study we consider the contribution of associative mechanisms to 
SoA. SoA can be measured quantitatively as a temporal linkage between voluntary actions 
and their external effects. Using an outcome blocking procedure, it was shown that training 
action-outcome associations under conditions of increased surprise augmented this temporal 
linkage. Moreover, these effects of surprise were correlated with schizotypy scores, 
suggesting that individual differences in higher level experiences are related to associative 
learning and to its impact on SoA. These results are discussed in terms of models of SoA, and 
our understanding of disrupted SoA in certain disorders.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The feeling of producing events through one’s own intentional behaviour is referred to as 
‘Sense of Agency’ (SoA), and has been the focus of much research. A key challenge is to 
elucidate the nature of processes underpinning this experience.  
 
Various findings point towards the importance of learning in the context of SoA. For 
example, SoA appears to be sensitive to the causal relation between actions and outcomes 
(Cravo, Claessens, & Baldo, 2009; Franck et al., 2001;  Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, 
Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009). Furthermore, pharmacological manipulations suggest that 
SoA is dependent on neural circuits implicated in instrumental learning (Moore et al 2010). 
Certain theoretical models of SoA also point towards the importance of learning. For 
example, it has been suggested that SoA is informed by sensorimotor predictions generated as 
part of the normal system of motor control (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, 
Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). Given that valid predictions are the hallmark of successful 
learning, this model, at least implicitly, recognises the contribution of learning. In light of the 
apparent importance of learning for SoA it is surprising that the precise mechanisms of that 
learning have received little attention. This is something the current study wished to address.  
 
Associative mechanisms may be one way in which learning about action-outcome relations is 
achieved. Central to traditional theories of associative learning is the role of surprise or 
prediction error (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).  
According to these theories, more learning occurs when the outcome is unexpected. The 
importance of surprise for learning can be demonstrated by blocking – traditionally regarded 
as the canonical test of the involvement of associative mechanisms (Dickinson, 1981). In a 
standard blocking paradigm (see Kamin, 1969), pre-training a cue(X)-outcome association 
blocks the subsequent formation of a novel cue(Y)-outcome association when that cue(Y) is 
subsequently trained in compound with the original cue(X). The blocking of cue(Y)-outcome 
associations is thought to occur because the outcome is already fully predicted by cue(X) 
during compound training: there is no surprise and therefore little new learning.  
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The importance of associative mechanisms for instrumental learning has also been 
demonstrated. Flach and colleagues (Flach, Osman, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2006) developed an 
outcome blocking procedure in which the outcomes competed for association with the action. 
This differs from traditional blocking designs, described above, in which preceding events 
compete for association with a subsequent event. In their design, a pre-training stage 
established action-outcome associations between two actions (right and left key presses) and 
two visual outcomes (coloured patches). In a compound training stage, these actions were 
then paired with a compound of two outcomes (a coloured patch and a tone). For one action, 
the visual outcome was the same as that learned during pre-training so that only the auditory 
outcome was unexpected. For the other action both outcomes were entirely novel and 
therefore surprising. They found that the strength of action-outcome associations was 
stronger when both outcomes during training were surprising. In the present study we use 
Flach et al’s outcome blocking procedure to examine the influence of surprise on the learning 
of action-outcome relations, and the impact this has on SoA.  
 
Our measure of SoA was an implicit one based on the perceived temporal relation between 
actions and outcomes. Previous research by Haggard, Clark and Kalogeras (2002) found that 
situations that elicit SoA are associated with a subjective compression of the interval between 
an action and its sensory outcome. In an agency condition, in which their actions produced 
tones, participants judged the time of an action or the time of the subsequent tone, in separate 
blocks of trials. Actions were perceived as occurring later in time, i.e. shifted towards the 
tone when compared to a non-agency condition in which participants’ actions did not produce 
tones.  In addition, a tone that followed the action was perceived as occurring earlier, i.e. 
shifted in time towards the action that caused it (again, in comparison to a non-agency 
condition involving tones but no actions). Critically, these shifts were found for voluntary 
actions but not when the tone was caused by an involuntary movement. Therefore, increased 
SoA is associated with a later awareness of the action (e.g. a key press), and an earlier 
awareness of the outcome (e.g. a tone; see Figure 1): actions and outcomes are bound 
together in time. This effect has been consistently replicated (see Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003; 
Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007; Engbert, Wohlschläger, & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Wegner, 
& Haggard, 2009), and has also been shown to correlate with explicit higher-order changes in 
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the SoA, as measured using subjective rating scales (Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Moore & 
Haggard, 2010). This temporal binding therefore offers a precise, implicit measure of SoA. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In the present experiment, participants performed the same outcome blocking procedure 
developed by Flach et al (2006). The only change was to the test phase, where we replaced 
Flach et al’s measure of instrumental learning with our temporal binding measure of SoA. 
We predicted that binding at test would be augmented for actions that were previously trained 
with entirely novel, and therefore surprising, outcomes.    
 
In addition, we sought to relate the effects of surprise on binding to individual difference 
measures. In particular we focussed on schizotypy scales designed to quantify perceptions 
and beliefs that may be akin to those found in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia may be 
characterised by a disturbance in, or confusion over, one’s SoA, something that has also been 
associated with higher scores on schizotypy scales (e.g. Asai, Sugimori, & Tanno, 2008). 
This is especially relevant to the current experimental manipulation given that recent models 
of the symptoms of schizophrenia emphasise the role of disturbed prediction error generated 
by surprising events (Gray, Feldon, Rawlins, Hemsley, & Smith, 1991; Kapur, 2003; Corlett, 
Honey, & Fletcher, 2007; Corlett et al., 2007; Murray et al., 2008; Fletcher & Frith, 2009). 
Although the link between schizotypy and schizophrenia is not fully established, given the 
putative link, the schizotypy dimension is therefore relevant when considering individual 
differences on effects of surprise on SoA. 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Participants 
16 right-handed participants were recruited to the study (11 Female; mean age = 25 years). 
One participant was excluded based on failure to follow task instructions. All participants 
provided informed consent. Research was approved by University of Cambridge Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee. 
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2.2 Outcome Blocking Procedure 
The experiment consisted of three sequential phases (see Figure 2 for schematic).  
 
Phase 1 - Pre-training: Participants freely pressed one of two keys on each trial at a time of 
their own choosing. The ‘left key’ was pressed with the left index finger and the ‘right key’ 
was pressed with right index finger. These key presses caused a flash of colour to be 
displayed in a rectangular box on the centre a computer screen in front of them (duration: 
200ms) after a delay of 250ms. The colour was either red or pink. The mapping of colour to 
key press was constant throughout this phase, and was fully counterbalanced across 
participants. This phase consisted of 80 trials. 
 
Phase 2 – Compound training: Participants freely pressed one of two keys on each trial at a 
time of their own choosing. Key presses caused both a flash of colour and a tone to be 
presented simultaneously (duration: 200ms) after a delay of 250ms. The colour was either 
one that had been presented during pre-training (red or pink), or a new colour (black). The 
tone was either a high or low pitch tone. The mapping of the compound stimulus to key press 
was constant throughout this phase, and assignment of the auditory stimuli to the two actions 
was fully counterbalanced across participants. The presentation of stimuli ensured that for 
each participant one key press always caused an entirely novel stimulus compound (surprise 
condition), whereas the other key press always caused a stimulus compound in which the 
colour had been previously associated with the same key press in the pre-training phase 
(expected condition). This phase consisted of 80 trials. 
 
Phase 3 – Test: This test was based on previous studies on the temporal experience of action-
outcome associations (e.g. Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002)  and is shown schematically 
in Figure 3. Participants freely pressed one of the two keys when they felt the urge to do so. 
Pressing the key caused, after a delay of 250 ms, the same tone that had followed that key 
press in the compound training phase. Time judgements were made using a clock hand 
rotating around a clock face. The clock face was located centrally on the computer screen and 
was marked at conventional 5 minute intervals. The clock hand rotated rapidly around the 
clock face at a speed of one revolution every 2.56s. The clock hand continued to rotate for a 
random period of time after the presentation of the tone. When the clock hand stopped 
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rotating, participants were prompted to verbally report the position of the clock hand on the 
clock face either when they had pressed the key, or when they had heard the subsequent tone. 
Participants performed one block of action judgements and one block of tone judgements. 
Each block consisted of 40 trials, and their order was counterbalanced. For each participant, 
the mapping of tone to key press was kept constant, but was counterbalanced across 
participants. Surprise action-tone pairings were those in which the tones had previously been 
presented in the novel stimulus compound, expected action-tone pairings were those in which 
the tones had previously been presented with a pre-trained colour. 
 
Mean judgement errors for each trial type (surprise/ expected) and for each judgement type 
(Action/ Tone) were calculated for each participant. Mean judgement errors are the mean of 
the trial-by-trial differences between judged time and actual time of event onset (judged time 
minus actual time). Later action awareness and earlier tone awareness reflect enhanced SoA, 
which is manifest by a positive shift in the mean judgment error for the response and a 
negative shift for the tone. For the analysis, test trials were divided into early (first 20 trials) 
and late (final 20 trials), as previous research has shown that effects of training may change 
over time (Moran, Al-Uzri, Watson, & Reveley, 2003; Flach, Osman, Dickinson, & Heyes, 
2006). 
 
2.3 Schizotypy measures 
The Perceptual Aberration Scale (Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 1978) is a 35-item scale 
assessing distortions in the perceptual experience of one’s own body and surroundings (e.g. 
“Occasionally I have felt as though my body did not exist”).  
 
The Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983) is a 30-item scale assessing beliefs 
that are inconsistent with the cultural standard (e.g. “I have felt that I might cause something 
to happen just by thinking too much about it”).  
 
The Peters Delusion Inventory (Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004) is a 21-item scale 
designed to measure delusional ideation in the normal population (e.g. “Do your thoughts 
ever feel alien to you in some way?”). When an item is endorsed, three five-point scales 
exploring distress, preoccupation, and beliefs are then completed. 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 
3. Results  
 
3.1. Effect of surprise on binding 
We analysed subjective time estimates of actions (key presses) and outcomes (tones) on early 
and late test trials as a function of the surprisingness of that association during training. Test 
trials were divided into early (first 20 trials) and late (final 20 trials), as previous research has 
shown that effects of training may change over time (Moran, Al-Uzri, Watson, & Reveley, 
2003; Flach et al., 2006). 
 
Mean judgement error of action and tone time estimates for trials (early vs. late) are shown in 
Figure 4. Inspection of the graph suggests that training under conditions of augmented 
outcome surprise enhanced the temporal binding of actions and tones at test (later action 
judgements and earlier tone judgements), but only on late test trials. 
 
To test this, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on factors of time (early, late), 
training (surprise, expected), and judged event (action, tone). There were no significant main 
effects of time, training, or judged event, and no significant two-way interactions between 
these factors. However, there was a significant three-way interaction between all three 
factors, F(1,14) = 7.26, p < .05 (partial eta-squared = .34).  
 
Follow-up repeated measures ANOVA analyses (training x judged event) were performed for 
both early and late test trials. There were no significant main effects and no interaction for 
early test trials. For late test trials there was a significant main effect of judged event, F(1,14), 
= 7.53, p < .05 (partial eta-squared = .35). Tones were perceived significantly later than 
actions (relative to actual event onset).  
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More importantly, there was a significant interaction between training and judged event for 
late test trials, F(1,14) = 11.20, p < .01 (partial eta-squared = .44). Follow-up paired-samples 
t-tests showed that training under a condition of augmented surprise was associated with 
significantly later action awareness compared with expected trials, t(14) = 2.25, p < .05 (2-
tailed; Cohen’s d = .24). There was no significant effect of training on the awareness of tones, 
t(14) = 1.75, p = .10 (2-tailed; Cohen’s d= .15). This suggests that the effect of training with 
surprising outcomes on SoA is limited to late test trials and is most pronounced for actions.    
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
3.2 Schizotypy and the effects of surprise on binding 
 
The mean schizotypy scores were as follows: PDI = 77 (range: 14-131; Cronbach’s Alpha: 
.76); Chapman Magical Ideation = 8 (range: 3-15; Cronbach’s Alpha: .80); Chapman 
Perceptual Aberration = 7 (range: 0-21; Cronbach’s Alpha: .88). For purposes of comparison, 
Table 1 shows example mean scores (and ranges where available) from healthy controls and 
patients with schizophrenia tested in previous larger-scale studies. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
We then assessed the relationship between schizotypy and the effects of surprise on binding. 
The magnitude of the outcome surprise effect was calculated for early and late test trials. To 
assess this magnitude, we first generated a composite measure of binding (tone judgement 
error minus action judgement error) for ‘expected’ and ‘surprise’ training on early and late 
test trials. The magnitude of the outcome surprise effect represented the difference in the 
surprise and expected composite measures (surprise composite measure minus expected 
composite measure). The more positive this difference, the greater the surprise effect.  
 
Schizotypy scores on each of the scales were correlated with magnitude of the surprise effect 
(see Figure 5), using the non-parametric Spearman’s rank order correlation (1-tailed). This 
analysis was limited to late test trials as the surprise effect was only observed on these trials. 
Significant negative correlations were found for the relationship between the magnitude of 
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the surprise effect and magical ideation (rho = -.52, p < .05), and perceptual aberration (rho = 
-.62, p <.01). There was also a near significant negative correlation between the magnitude of 
the surprise effect and the Peters Delusion Inventory (rho = -.43, p = .057). These correlations 
suggest that the effects of surprise during training are reduced in those scoring higher on the 
schizotypy scales. 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
This experiment found that surprise exerts an influence over SoA. Using an outcome 
blocking procedure we were able to show that training with more surprising outcomes 
augmented binding at test (at least on later test trials), indicative on an increased SoA This 
result confirms the importance of learning in the context of SoA. Moreover, it suggests that 
associative mechanisms may be involved. Finally, the effects of surprise on SoA were 
correlated with schizotypy scores, suggesting that individual differences in associative 
learning may be related to higher level experiences of the world that resemble (to varying 
degrees) those associated with schizophrenia.    
 
4.1 Associative learning and SoA 
Despite the fact that the role of learning is recognised in empirical (e.g. Moore et al., 2009) 
and theoretical (e.g. Frith, 1992; Frith et al., 2000) work on SoA, the nature of this learning 
has, rather surprisingly, received little attention. Blocking is traditionally regarded as a 
canonical demonstration of associative learning mechanisms (Dickinson, 1981). Therefore, 
the sensitivity of binding to our outcome blocking procedure strongly implies the 
involvement of associative mechanisms in producing SoA. 
 
Outcome prediction is thought to play a key role in generating SoA (Frith et al., 2000; 
Blakemore et al., 2002). Indeed, a previous study using the binding task found that the 
magnitude of binding was sensitive to the strength of the outcome prediction (Moore & 
Haggard, 2008). The present experiment complements this finding by shedding light on the 
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learning mechanism that enables such predictions. Specifically, our data suggest that the 
learning necessary for outcome prediction is achieved, at least in part, by associative 
mechanisms. 
 
The role of surprise has been emphasised in previous theoretical accounts of agency 
experience. For example, Frith and colleagues have suggested that SoA is decreased when the 
outcome is surprising (e.g. Frith et al., 2000; see also, Barnier, Dienes, & Mitchell, 2008, for 
a discussion of the role of surprise in the experience of control under hypnosis). Whilst the 
present results support the role of surprise in SoA, they offer a rather different view of its 
contribution to SoA, namely that in the long-run surprise may augment SoA. Although we 
shall not recapitulate here the extensive discussion of associative explanations concerning the 
role of surprise in outcome blocking offered by Flach et al (2006), the present results are 
compatible with the attentional account of Pearce and Hall (1980). They suggest that the 
attention paid to an antecedent event, in this case a response, is determined by whether or not 
that event has previously been associated with a prediction error generated by surprising 
outcomes. Therefore, the attention paid to the responses should have decreased during 
pretraining as their respective visual outcomes came to be anticipated. The introduction of the 
auditory outcome during compound training would have been surprising, resulting in partial 
restoration of attention to the response and some response-tone learning. However, the 
additional presence of the unexpected visual outcome in the surprise condition would have 
produced an even greater prediction error and restoration of attention to the response, thereby 
supporting even more sustained action-outcome learning.   
 
We propose that so long as an agent recognises itself as the originator of an event by 
attending to its own behaviour, the strength of action-outcome associations will be updated. 
A corollary of this view is that individual differences in the extent to which an agent 
recognises itself as the originator of an event will lead to different error-driven learning 
effects. If someone has a tendency to attribute error to an external source they will be less 
likely to use that error to update their own causal beliefs. This may explain attenuated 
blocking effects on our task in participants scoring higher on the schizotypy scales: in the 
condition of augmented surprise they fail to increase the strength of the action-outcome 
association, possibly because they fail to register the fact that they are responsible for the 
Moore et al 
 
12 
 
unexpected event (maybe in these participants error itself promotes a stronger feeling that 
they were not the originator of the unexpected event).  
 
The putative involvement of associative mechanisms is consistent with a previous result 
showing that SoA (as measured by binding) was altered by manipulations of dopamine 
availability in patients with Parkinson’s Disease (PD; Moore et al., 2010). Using an ON-OFF 
drug withdrawal design, it was found that although binding in PD patients OFF their 
dopaminergic medication was similar to controls, binding in the same PD patients ON 
medication was significantly increased. By coding prediction error, dopaminergic systems 
have a special role in associative learning. It was therefore suggested that the exaggerated 
binding found in PD patients ON medication could have been driven by a change in 
dopaminergic prediction error signalling, augmenting the strength of action-outcome 
associations. This suggestion is bolstered by the observation in the current paper that SoA is 
indeed likely to have an associative basis. Furthermore, given the hypothesised role of 
disrupted prediction error signalling in the genesis of schizophrenia, our observation that SoA 
has an associative basis, and which in turn may be linked to dopamine function, is also 
relevant to understanding impaired SoA associated with that disorder (see 3.2 below). 
 
The contribution of associative learning mechanisms to SoA has further implications for 
theoretical accounts of SoA. At the very least this finding emphasises the need to a) recognise 
the dynamic nature of SoA, and b) consider the specific mechanisms enabling learning in the 
context of SoA. Perhaps more fundamentally, the putative role of associative learning 
mechanisms strongly encourages us to reconsider the contribution of automatic low level 
processes to this higher level experience. Furthermore, the aforementioned link between 
mechanism (associative learning) and neurobiology (dopamine) in the context of SoA is 
appealing, offering the possibility of a more comprehensive account of SoA and its 
disturbance in certain disorders. 
 
4.2 Surprise, SoA, and Schizotypy 
We found significant correlations between the effect of surprise on SoA and scores on 
schizotypy scales. Specifically, the effect of surprise during training was reduced in highly 
schizotypal individuals. Given the similarity between the procedure used in this experiment 
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and traditional blocking procedures, this result is consistent with previous investigations of 
blocking and schizotypy (e.g. Moran et al., 2003).  
 
Although the relationship between schizotypy and schizophrenia is yet to be fully explicated, 
it is thought that schizotypal characteristics are likely to represent cognitive vulnerability for 
the disorder (Chapman, Chapman, & Kwapil, 1994; Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad, 
& Zinser, 1994; Langdon & Coltheart, 1999). In this respect our data may be in keeping with 
previous work emphasising the link between disrupted associative learning and 
schizophrenia. According to this perspective, disrupted prediction error signalling is thought 
to underpin many of the signs and symptoms of schizophrenia. Moreover, such disruption is 
thought to be of central importance to the genesis of psychotic illness (Corlett et al., 2007), 
and as such, studies linking schizotypy to disrupted prediction error signalling may be 
especially informative (see, for example, Corlett et al., 2009).  
 
These data show that participants scoring higher on schizotypy scales were less sensitive to 
prior associative history. As discussed above, this may be linked to differences in the way 
that these individuals process surprising events during training. Such reduced sensitivity may 
underlie the different experiences of, and beliefs about, the world that are reflected in high 
scores on the schizotypy scales. However, owing to the intimate relation between perception 
and belief, and the fact that both may be underpinned by a common mechanism involving the 
minimisation of prediction error (Fletcher & Frith, 2009), we would not expect differences in 
the strength of the association between sensitivity to prior associative history and the 
perception (Chapman Perceptual Aberration) or belief (Peters Delusion Inventory and 
Chapman Magical Ideation) schizotypy scales. This was indeed what we found.   
 
Although such schizotypy-related differences on associative learning tasks have been 
demonstrated before, to our knowledge this is the first study demonstrating such deficits on 
an instrumental task. Compared with Pavlovian paradigms (where performance is based on 
learning relations between external stimuli), instrumental paradigms may be more relevant to 
symptoms of schizophrenia in which willed action and the SoA may be altered (as is the case 
in delusions of control). Our findings raise the possibility that the differential levels of 
sensitivity to surprise leads to a profoundly different experience of our actions on the world. 
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The choosing and carrying out of these actions is absolutely critical to how we sample, and 
therefore learn about, the world (Friston, 2009; Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner, & Kiebel, 2010). 
A corollary of this would be that such a fundamental variation might lead to a very different 
experience of the world and, correspondingly, altered inferences about its causal structures 
and one’s own capacity to alter it.  
 
4.3 Limitations 
The fact that training effects were only found on late test trials was unexpected. In the initial 
test trials of the expected condition there would have been a (surprising) omission of an 
expected visual effect. If surprise influences the degree of binding (as implied by our overall 
results) it may have initially augmented the magnitude of binding on early test trials, 
therefore masking the effects of prior associative learning history. With further testing, the 
omission of the visual outcome would have no longer been surprising thereby attenuating this 
‘local’ surprise effect in the expected condition and allowing the sustained associative 
surprise effect on the SoA to be observed in the surprise condition. 
 
Given the relatively small sample size one should be careful in drawing overly strong 
conclusions regarding the correlation between schizotypy and the effects of surprise on our 
task. However, it is encouraging that significant (or near significant) negative correlations 
were observed on all three schizotypy scales, which we believe is highly suggestive of a 
genuine association. 
 
As stated above, the relationship between schizotypy and schizophrenia is yet to be fully 
explicated. In this way, one should be cautious when discussing schizotypy findings in terms 
of their relevance for schizophrenia. However, it has been repeatedly shown on experimental 
tasks that the behaviour of individuals scoring high on schizotypy scales resembles that of 
patients with schizophrenia (Peters, 2010), and our data provide further demonstration of this 
concordance. We would like to further suggest that, given sufficient confidence in the 
relationship between schizotypy and schizophrenia, the schizotypy dimension offers an 
invaluable research tool, allowing us to explore patterns of perception, experience and 
cognition redolent of schizophrenia, in a sample that is free of medication and hospitalisation 
(both of which can be deeply problematic confounds in patient samples). 
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Finally, certain limitations of our test phase should be acknowledged. Firstly, the test phase 
was fairly short, consisting of 40 trials per judgement type (action or tone). However, the fact 
that learning effects could be detected would suggest that the duration of the test phase 
sufficient. Secondly, the test phase was divided into early and late trials. With such a division 
one inevitably ends up treating two trials that are positioned close together in time, as being 
early or late, based on whether they were the first or last 20 trials of the test block. Although 
this may be a rather imprecise way of characterising learning, it nevertheless still allows us to 
determine the presence of any general changes in behaviour during the course of the test 
phase. A priori, we felt that it was important to assess these possible changes owing to 
previous studies suggesting that the effects of learning may change during the test phase.     
 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
Our study has shown that learning underpinning SoA (as measured by binding) may be 
governed, at least in part, by associative mechanisms. This novel finding has implications for 
theoretical accounts of SoA and for understanding disrupted SoA in certain disorders. This is 
confirmed by the fact that the effect of surprise on binding was correlated with scores on 
schizotypy rating scales. Owing to the possible relationship between schizotypy and 
schizophrenia, this suggests that models emphasising the role of aberrant (dopaminergic) 
prediction error signalling in the emergence of psychosis may have validity in understanding 
the nature of experience in schizotypy. 
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Table 1. Example mean scores (with range where available) on the schizotypy scales 
that were used in the present study. Data are from controls and patients with 
schizophrenia tested in previous studies.   
 
 
  
Peters Delusion Inventory  
(from Peters et al., 2004) 
 
Magical Ideation Scale  
(from Peters et al., 1999) 
 
Perceptual Aberration Scale  
(from Chapman et al., 1978) 
 
Healthy 
controls 
 
58.9 (0-291) 
 
11.5 (5-25) 
 
5.14 (N/A) 
Schizophrenia 
patients 
 
130.5 (0-317) 13.7 (5-25) 7.68 (N/A) 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Sense of agency is associated with changes in the perceived time of actions and 
outcomes. Increased sense of agency is associated with later awareness of action and earlier 
awareness of outcome.  
 
Figure 2. The training and test phases in Experiment 2 (following Flach et al., 2006). See text 
for details. 
 
Figure 3. The trial structure used in the test phase (following Haggard et al., 2002). Clock 
begins rotating at start of each trial. Participant presses one of two keys whenever they feel 
the urge to do so. After a brief delay (250ms) the tone is presented. After a random period of 
time the clock hand then stops rotating. The participant is then prompted to make their time 
judgement i.e. the time (1-60) that corresponds to the position of the hand on the clock face 
when they pressed the key or, in a separate block of trials, when they heard the tone. 
 
Figure 4. Mean judgment errors in ms (SD across subjects) for ‘expected’ and ‘surprise’ 
training (early vs. late). Zero on the y-axis represents actual event onset. Later action (key 
press) awareness and earlier outcome (tone) awareness reflects increased binding. This is 
indicative of increased SoA (see text).  
 
Figure 5. Scatter plots depicting relation between magnitude of outcome surprise effect and 
A) Magical Ideation scores, B) Perceptual Aberration scores, and C) PDI scores. 
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